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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The first large scale social protection system in
Portugal was created in 1929 to cover public sec-
tor employees. It still exists today and it is called
Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA). By any physical
or financial measure the CGA is a large pension
system in the Portuguese context even though it is
smaller than the Social Security system that covers
most of the workers in the private sector.
A couple of figures help to illustrate the rela-
tive size of the two systems. In 1998, Social Secu-
rity had 4.3 million active contributors whereas
that figure for CGA was 681 thousand, a ratio of
16 per cent. As of 2000, Social Security had nearly
2.5 million old age, survivor and disability pen-
sioners while in the CGA there was 428 thousand
pensioners, a ratio of 17.1 per cent. However, the
expenditures on pensions for old age, disability
and survivors in Social Security were 6.1 per cent
of GDP for Social Security and 3.6 per cent of GDP
for the CGA, a ratio of about 60 per cent.
There is no reason to expect that the relative
importance of the CGA financial flows will de-
cline in the coming years. That is the motivation
for this paper. Its objectives are to estimate the
main demographic and financial trends character-
izing CGA’s foreseeable future and to evaluate
their consequences for the public finances.
2. THE CGA: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND
QUANTITATIVE CHARACTERIZATION
2.1. Contributors, retirees and pensioners
The CGA pays old age and disability pensions
to former contributors and survivor pensions to
widows and descendants of CGA contributors or
pensioners. It is also responsible for other types of
pensions that governments decide to award for
special reasons, such as pensions to families of
military personnel killed or injured in the line of
duty. The CGA also acts as an intermediary in the
payment of pension to retirees from several cur-
rent and former state-owned firms.
The data available from CGA is based on ag-
gregates of administrative records and it does not
distinguish between old age and disability retir-
ees(1). Also, there are some aspects where the data
does not make it possible to distinguish survivors
from other types of pensioners.
In the general case, for the subscribers that
joined the system before September 1993, the
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(1) Given that the pension formula is the same in both cases that
distinction is not really relevant for our purposes.monthly pension of a new retiree is defined as 100
per cent of the gross-of-tax wage earned in the last
month of service for those who had 36 years of re-
corded contributions(2). For those whose career
span was less than 36 years there was a propor-
tional reduction in the pension. In some excep-
tional cases pensions were defined with respect to
earnings over the last two or the last three years.
The minimum number of years to earn the right to
a pension was 5 and any civil servant can choose
to retire after age 65, or with 36 years of service
provided he is over 60(3). As of 2001 the majority
of current CGA contributors is still in this regime.
However, entry into this regime was terminated
in 1993. Civil servants admitted after September
1993 have pensions with Social Security’s rules,
which are less generous than the ones we just de-
scribed.
The CGA is run as a pure Pay-As-You-Go
(PAYG) system. Pensions are paid out from civil
servants contributions. Each civil servant’s contri-
bution is 10 per cent of the relevant wage. Addi-
tionally, government uses general revenues to
contribute with the amount necessary to balance
the annual CGA budget. This means that the gen-
eral government’s contribution has a residual na-
ture and thus it is not defined as a proportion of
the civil servants pay.
2.2. Recent evolution
By the end of 2000, the number of CGA contri-
butors reached 747 449, almost 94 000 contributors
more than 10 years before, a rise of 12.5 per cent.
This growing trend was only interrupted briefly
in 1993-1995 (see Chart 1). These figures corre-
spond to an average growth rate of 1.3 per cent
per year during the decade. Despite that, the de-
pendency ratio(4) was raised from 39 to 57 per
cent, due to the increase in the numbers of retirees
and pensioners(5).
The CGA PAYG system historically demanded
a relatively low financial effort from the general
government. The dependency ratio was low be-
cause life expectancy after retirement was small
and because the number of civil servants was
growing. As the system matured, the tensions in
the PAYG system became more explicit, and the
general government contributions had to rise.
Chart 2 shows how pension expenditure grew in
the 1990’s and how that growth was financed by a
stable contribution share from workers (as a per-
centage of GDP) and by a growing share of the
general government’s residual contribution,
reaching up to 2.1 percentage points of GDP by
2000. Other revenues include payments from for-
mer government owned firms and other entities.
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(2) The benefit rules that apply in practice are slightly more com-
plex. Every year, the Minister of Finance issues an executive or-
der (Portaria) defining the annual increase of the CGA
pensions. That same order always says that pensions should
not be increased long as they stay, above 90 per cent of their
statutory level. This means that in any given year, a pension is
defined as the maximum of the initial nominal pension or of 90
per cent of the initial pension adjusted by the annual increases
of pensions. After a few years of erosion, all pensions are based
on 90 per cent of what one would expect from statutes alone.
All our calculations include, for new and recent retirees, the
transitional years of declining real pensions. The calculations
then assume a cost-of-living adjustment for each pension based
on 90 per cent of its initial real value.
(3) A 1985 Decree allows civil servants to retire before reaching 60,
conditional on having a full career. This exception was de-
signed as a temporary measure to decongest the civil service,


























































Contributors Old age and disability pensioners
Other pensioners Dependency ratio
(4) The dependency ratio is defined as the number of pensioners
for each contributor.
(5) If the number of contributors had been kept at the 1990 level,
the dependency ratio would have reached 0.65 in 2000.
Source: CGA.2.3. The CGA system in 1998
Given the data available, it was decided to an-
chor the construction of the scenarios for the fu-
ture evolution of the CGA in 1998, using 1999 and
2000 to test and calibrate the parameters of the
model.
In 1998, the CGA had 197 388 retirees distrib-
uted by age and gender according to Table 1. Men
are two thirds of the total retirees. There is a
higher proportion of retirees in the “70 and over”
male cohorts than in the matching female cohorts.
These two facts might be explained by the late ar-
rival of women to the formal labour market.
3. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOUR MARKET
3.1. Civil service composition by age, sex, education
and tenure
In 1998 the CGA counted 681 169 contributors,
and in contrast to the pensioner’s data, male and
female contributors were almost evenly divided.
Coincidentally, males and females had the same
average age.
A useful source of information on the public
sector labour force is the 1999 Civil Service Cen-
sus(6). The census shows(7) that women are the
majority in the civil service and that they have, on
average, higher levels of schooling. Furthermore
the difference in years of schooling between males
and females is larger in the youngest cohorts. This
means that in the next few years, the mean educa-
tion gap between genders will most likely get
wider.
The 1999 civil service census also shows that
men have higher tenure than women in the youn-
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Pensions General government contribution
Civil servants contribution Other revenue
Table 1
NUMBER, GENDER AND AGE
OF CGA RETIREES IN 1998
Female Male
Number % Number %
Less than 50 years old ......... 33 8 8 3 . 4 1 31 5 3 6 . 6
Between 50 and 60 years old . . . 22 032 22.3 45 131 22.7
Between 41 and 50 years old . . . 40 316 40.8 69 699 35.1
Between 70 and 80 years old . . . 25 606 28.0 53 713 29.6
More than 80 years old ........ 74 7 1 8 . 2 1 68 7 9 9 . 3
Total........................ 9 88 1 3 100.0 198 575 100.0
% Total retirees............... 33.2 66.7
Average age (years old) ....... 65.8 65.3
Source: CGA.
Table 2
NUMBER, GENDER AND AGE
OF CGA SUBSCRIBERS IN 1998
Female Male
Number % Number %
Up to 30 years old ............ 5 38 9 3 15.8 61 968 18.2
Between 31 and 40 years old . . . 104 593 30.8 92 465 27.1
Between 41 and 50 years old . . 109 133 32.1 111 757 32.8
Between 51 and 60 years old . . . 58 661 17.3 57 299 16.8
Between 61 and 70 years old . . 13 739 4.0 17 661 5.2
Total ....................... 3 4 00 1 9 100.0 341 150 100.0
% Total subscribers .......... 49.9 50.1
Average age (years)........... 41.8 41.8
Source: CGA.
(6) The census and CGA’s demographic and wage data do not co-
incide perfectly as a few CGA subscribers are not civil servants
and a few public sector employees are not CGA subscribers.
However the populations covered overlap extensively and the
census data is useful because it has more detailed information
on the characteristics of the employees.
(7) The details of the analysis are not shown here for brevity’s
sake.
Source: CGA.gest cohorts, but that this is reversed in the co-
horts above 50. Furthermore, the CGA data on the
distribution of tenure at retirement, by age, is rela-
tively stable over time. This stability of the age-
tenure profile is helpful in terms of constructing
the scenarios for the medium and long-term evo-
lution of the CGA.
3.2. Civil service earnings
Chart 3 displays a graph with male and female
average earnings by age, after normalizing the
wage of a male 20 year old to 100. The figure shows
that mean earnings by age increase up until age 50
for women and 55 for men. Older workers, espe-
cially women, have a negatively sloped pattern.
Chart 4 shows the age distribution of civil ser-
vants. There is a concentration of workers in the
interval of 35 to 50 years of age.
A remarkable feature of the civil service in Por-
tugal is that women are much more educated than
men. This justifies why there are more male than
female civil servants in the younger cohorts
(Chart 4), and also explains why, in 1999, the fe-
male average wage was 7.7 per cent higher than
the males’ average wage. However, this does not
mean that women are not discriminated in civil
service as the mean wage difference is less than
what one should expect given the large disparities
in the levels of education. In fact, a woman with
the female average for characteristics like age, ten-
ure and schooling receives a wage 16.4 per cent
lower than a man with the same characteristics.
On the opposite side, a man with the male aver-
age age, years of schooling and tenure has a wage
23 per cent higher than the wage of an otherwise
similar woman.
The wage patterns by gender, age, schooling,
tenure and potential experience were captured by
regression analysis, the results of which were used
later to forecast wage structures over time.
3.3. Civil service hiring, retirement, and separation
patterns
We do not have data bearing directly on hiring
by the Civil Service, but we have data on entries
into the CGA. This data shows that entry in the
civil service occurs mostly before age 30, with
males entering at younger ages than females, a
fact consistent with the males’ lower levels of
schooling. Entries after age 40 are rare, particu-
larly for males.
Civil servants hired before 1993 with 36 years
of tenure can retire with a full pension provided
they are over 60. In practice, many retire before
they are 60. Chart 5 shows the retirement-age pat-
tern by gender in the CGA data. Men have peak
hazard rates(8)at 60 and 65 and women at 65.
Other outflows from the Civil Service are ex-
tremely small. Firing is extremely uncommon, and
quitting the Civil Service is also rare(9).
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Source: 1999 Civil Service Census.
Chart 4
CIVIL SERVANTS AGE DISTRIBUTION
(8) The retirement rate for a given age is the ratio of the number of
retirements of people of that age over the number of civil ser-
vants that were one year younger the previous year.4. THE PROJECTION ASSUMPTIONS
4.1. Basic methodology
Although the CGA accounting system does not
provide separate data for the before and after 1993
regimes(10), we will proceed based on estimates
and we will consider separately the two schemes
with their different pension formulas.
To project the future of the CGA system it is
necessary to make assumptions about the way
three types of variables will evolve over time: eco-
nomic variables (interest rates, productivity or
GDP growth, etc.); physical variables of the sys-
tem (the number of civil servants, mortality rates,
etc.); and the parameters of the system (contribu-
tions rates, the statutory minimum retirement age,
etc.). These assumptions were combined in a
model to forecast the future physical and financial
flows of the system.
By the end of 2000, the CGA had public debt
funds in the amount of  400 million.These funds
were not included in our analysis, even though
they are important in the financial management of
the CGA. These funds are neutral with respect to
the financial shows between the public sector and
the other sectors in the economy.
The model used was the Pension Reform Op-
tions Simulation Tool-kit (PROST) constructed by
the World Bank to simulate and to evaluate re-
form options for the pension system (see
Worldbank (2001)).
4.2. Macroeconomic trends
From 1998 to 2001, the GDP real rate of growth
follows the recorded experience In the baseline
scenario for the GDP it was assumed that GDP ac-
celerates after 2002 reaching a steady state growth
of 2.9 per cent, in 2005. From 2005 onwards, GDP
growth is the sum of productivity growth plus the
growth of the working age population. The pro-
ductivity in Portugal is assumed to increased 1
percentage point above the average of the Euro-
pean Union(11). This convergence scenario would
allow Portuguese productivity to reach 90 per cent
of the average European productivity by 2040.
From that date till 2055, Portuguese productivity
growth convergence is complete. The PROST
model indexes the wage structure to the real wage
growth of 20 years old males. This growth corre-
sponds to the real wage growth not due to in-
creases of mean tenure or mean professional expe-
rience of the public sector labour force. In our
model general productivity plus educational
levels growth drive real wages. Our modelling as-
sumes that pensions are kept constant in real
terms.
We assume the steady state inflation to be
equal to 2 per cent. This rate holds for both the
GDP deflator and for the Consumer Price Index.
In the case of the real interest rate, the steady state
value was set equal to 3 per cent. Both figures be-
come effective after 2005 after a smooth transition
from their 2001 levels.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results
to the macroeconomics assumptions, we will also
report results obtained under different sets of as-
sumptions.
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(9) We will deal with mortality issues in the next section.
(10)CGA supplied aggregate data by age and gender for the num-
ber of subscribers in each regime at the end of 1997 and 1999.
The figures for 1998 are an estimate made by the authors.
(11)Using the AMECO database, we observe that productivity
growth from 1990 to 2001 in Portugal was about 1 p.p. higher
than the average growth in the European Union. We assumed
that the long run growth rate of the labour productivity in the
European Union is 1.25 per cent.4.3. Number of positions
Three alternative assumptions were made con-
cerning the evolution of the number of CGA con-
tributors. In the first one, the number of subscrib-
ers is held constant from 2002 onwards. In the sec-
ond one the number of positions is reduced allow-
ing only one entry for each four people retiring
from civil service between 2002 and 2006. The
third scenario corresponds to reducing the num-
ber of civil servants from 2035 onwards, in line
with the decrease of the working age population.
Deaths of civil servants and retirees are given
by the mortality rates supplied by Eurostat for the
period 1998-2050(12). From 2050 onwards, the mor-
tality rates are the same as in 2050.
5. BASELINE RESULTS
5.1. Contributors and pensioners
The first set of results from the model simula-
tion deals with physical units, i.e. numbers of con-
tributors and pensioners. The basic results can be
seen on Chart 6. The simulation was carried out
from the premise that there will be a constant level
of public sector workers, fixed at the total existing
at the end of 2001.
The total number of old-age and disability pen-
sioners is projected to increase from 294 thousand
in 1998 up to 648 thousand by 2045, and experi-
ence a gentle decline after that point down to 640
thousand by 2065. After that, the total number of
old-age and disability retirees becomes almost sta-
ble, barely reaching 647 thousand by 2075. Survi-
vor pensioners will increase up to a maximum of
129 thousand in 2025 after which they will decline
down to 117 thousand by 2060 after which their
number becomes stable.
The evolution of the total number of pension-
ers also grows from 407 thousand in 1998 up to
771 thousand by 2045, declining then to a low of
757 thousand by 2065, and growing again slowly
up to 764 thousand by 2075.
5.2. Financial flows
A first question refers to what would be the ex-
pected evolution of the general government con-
tributions to the CGA, if the 2001 status quo were
to be maintained until the end of the projection
horizon. In this status quo it is assumed that the
pension formula of the post-1993 subscribers is
defined by the February 19 Decree-Law
no.35/2002. The new rules include a grandfather
clause that allows subscribers already enrolled to
choose between the new formula and a weighted
average of the new and the old formula(13). This
current situation is defined to be the baseline sce-
nario.
In the baseline scenario the subscribers’ contri-
butions to CGAremain very stable as a percentage
of GDP, growing 0.3 percentage points (p.p.) from
2001(14) to 2075. However pension payments grow
at a higher pace, increasing 1.5 p.p. of GDP from
2001 up to 2020. After 2020 pension payments de-
crease 0.4 p.p. up to 2048 as a result of the change
in the pension formula that applies to the sub-
scribers enrolled in the CGAafter 1993. After 2050




























Source: Authors’ calculations using PROST.
(12)On the course of the model calibration, the Eurostat mortality
rates were slightly adjusted downward.
(13)The new social security base law has other grandfather clauses
for workers enrolled in the system before the law was passed.
However, those clauses do not seem to be relevant for civil ser-
vants.
(14)Although 1998 was taken as the base year, the comparisons are
made with respect to 2000. This means that it already takes into
account the large increase in the compensation of public sector
employees in the more recent years.pensions payments as a percentage of GDP grow
0.8 p.p. reaching 5.5 p.p. of GDP by 2075.
To measure the impact on public finances of fu-
ture general government expenditures we use a
concept of “additional expenditures”. These are
defined as those expenditures that exceed the per-
centage of current GDP that the general govern-
ment was spending in 2000, i.e. 2.1 per cent(15). All
values concerning the impact of CGA expendi-
tures on public finances are based on these addi-
tional expenditures.
Chart 7 shows the evolution of the general gov-
ernment additional contribution to CGA. The
general government primary contribution to CGA
will increase by 1.5 p.p. of GDP until 2022. From
then on, the general government expenditure
should decline to 1 per cent of GDP by 2050. After
2050, it is expected that the increase in the primary
expenditure will resume, showing that the mea-
sures taken in 1993 were not sufficient to keep the
system in a sustainable path. In 2075, the addi-
tional primary expenditure is expected to be 1.8
p.p. of GDP higher than in 2000.
On the assumption that no additional compen-
satory discretionary measures are taken (for exam-
ple tax increases), it is possible to have an approxi-
mate measure of these expenditures with the CGA
on the overall general government expenditure by
adding the interests on the debt generated. Total
expenditure flows grow over the entire period of
analysis. Comparing with 2000, total expenditure
increases by 2.2 p.p. of GDP by 2020, 4.4 p.p. by
2050, and by 9.1 p.p. by 2075. As for the debt
stock, it starts at zero by definition and grows up
to 153.5 per cent of GDP by 2075.
The basic assumptions about the evolution of
schooling and wages led to a maximum increase
in the civil servants wages of 2.8 p.p. of GDP for
the whole projection(16) horizon. Together the cu-
mulative increase in wages and the transfers to
CGA will induce a growth of 4.8 p.p. in the total
primary expenditure of general government
(Chart 8).
The implicit debt, defined as the present value
of the accrued rights of subscribers and pension-
ers(17), reached 122.9 per cent of GDP in 2000. In
this first scenario, this figure increases to 130.2 per
cent in 2013. As the pensioners and subscribers
enrolled in the CGA before 1993 pass away, the
implicit debt starts to reduce to about 114.5 per
cent of GDP by 2044. After that date the imbal-
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Primary expenditure w/CGA (left-hand scale)
Total expenditure (left-hand scale)
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROST. Lines repre-

































Total compensation of employees
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROST. Chart shows
differences to 2000 level.
(15)Since there is no specified contribution rate for government, we
make this assumption that defines 2000 current contributions
(as a percentage of GDP) as the counterfactual government
contributions.
(16)Note, however, that 0.3 p.p. of GDP was the recorded increase
from 2000 to 2001.
(17)We can interpret the implicit debt as the cost to shut down the
system now and pay all accrued rights to workers and pen-
sioners.ances of the system become more noticeable and
the implicit debt starts to grow up to 128.4 per
cent of GDP in 2075.
One question that might be asked is what
should be the total amount of assets, needed in
2000, to cover the increase of public expenditure
with the CGA in the time horizon of the projec-
tion. This is basically the present value of pay-
ments exceeding the present financial effort up to
2075, measured as a percentage of GDP. This con-
cept is known as the financing gap. In this case,
these assets would have amounted to 66.4 per cent
of GDP.
Another parameter estimate that may prove in-
teresting in conveying the disequilibrium situa-
tion of the CGA is the actuarially fair contribution
rate, or long run equilibrium contribution rate. This is
the rate (constant over time) that would drive the
financing gap to zero over the analysis horizon,
i.e. that would generate enough surpluses in the
best years to compensate for the deficits in the
worse years. While the current contribution rate is
10 per cent, in the baseline the long run balance
would be obtained by a contribution rate of 19.6
per cent(18).
In contrast, we can define two concepts that re-
late to the conditions necessary to have a financial
equilibrium of the CGA each year. The on going
contribution rate is the rate that would provide
enough contributions to balance the CGA in any
given year. Chart 9 displays the time profile of
these contribution rates. Alternatively, we can
think of achieving financial balance by adjusting
the expenditure on pensions. One way to do this
is to lower the replacement rate (i.e. the ratio be-
tween the mean wage and the mean pension). For
the CGA that ratio was 53.8 per cent in 2000. The
appendices show how the on going equilibrium
replacement rates evolve over time and under the
different scenarios considered.
6. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
6.1. Definition of alternatives
This paper tries to answer six questions about
financial flows. The first, seen in the previous sec-
tion, concerned the expected evolution of the gen-
eral government contributions to CGA, if the 2001
status quo were to be maintained. The second
question is on the extent to which the results from
the baseline are sensitive to the macroeconomic
assumptions made.
The third question asks what would have been
the path of the contributions by the general gov-
ernment in the absence of the 2001 change in the
benefits formula applying to the subscribers en-
rolled after September 1993.
The fourth scenario is retrospective and relates
to the quantitative importance of the 1993 reforms.
The fifth question is used to assess the impact
on CGA accounts of a policy change consisting in a
reduction in the number of CGA subscribers start-
ing in 2002 till 2006. The number of subscribers is
kept constant from 2006 onwards. The reduction is
attained allowing the entry of only one new sub-
scriber per four subscribers leaving the civil ser-
vice, due to retirement. The sixth question is on the
impact of reducing the size of the civil service after
2035 to keep it proportional to the working age
population. The simulations results will be pre-
sented as the differences, in percentage points of
GDP, with respect to what was observed in 2000.
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(18)The long run equilibrium rate measures the resources needed
to balance the CGA up to 2075, and should only be considered
as an alternative measure of the imbalance of the system. It has
no implications on which should be the proportion of the con-
tributions paid by the employer or by the employee.6.2. Sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions
To examine how sensitive the results were to
changes in growth rates for GDP, real wages and
productivity, we recalculated the baseline case
with periods of sustained higher and lower
growth rates by a quarter of percentage point. Re-
sults are displayed in Chart 10.
The optimistic (pessimistic) scenario differs
from de baseline because the growth rate of GDP
is higher (lower) than the baseline by 25 basis
points from 2005 up until 2040, the difference then
gradually disappearing by 2055. These same 25
basis points differences between the optimistic
(pessimistic) scenarios and the baseline hold for
productivity and real wage growth.
The results show that additional expenditures
with the CGA are larger the more pessimistic, i.e.
with less growth, the scenarios are. By 2075 total
additional expenditures will be 10.1 p.p. in the pes-
simistic scenario, 9.1 p.p. in the baseline and 8.2
p.p. in the optimistic case. As for primary addi-
tional expenditures on the CGA, they will be 1.5
p.p. by 2030 in the baseline scenario, 1.3 p.p. in the
optimistic scenario and 1.6 per cent in the pessimis-
tic one. These amounts then decline and go up
again, with differences narrowing down later up to
2075. Primary additional expenditures by 2075 will
be 1.9 in the pessimistic scenario and 1.8 p.p. in
both the optimistic and the baseline scenarios.
An alternative way to assess the impact of
changing macroeconomic conditions is to compare
the indicators already reported for the baseline
case (see Table 3).
These aggregate indicators reinforce the idea
that although the model’s results display some
quantitative sensitivity to the assumptions on
growth rates, nothing qualitatively important
changes when different assumptions are made.
6.3. The impact of the 2001 Social Security reforms
The Social Security reform implemented in
2001 impacts on the CGA because social security
benefit rules apply to public sector workers hired
after 1993. The reforms changed the benefit rules
by increasing the number of years of contributions
that are relevant to define the pension reference
wage to 40 (previously, the best 10 out of the last
15), by adding a maximum of 0.5 percentage
points annually to the inflation corrections of the
wage history, and by substituting the pension ac-
crual rates from 2 per cent per year of contribu-
tions to a progressive scale ranging from 2.3 per
cent to 2 per cent as the reference wage increases.
While going back a larger number of years in
computing the average real wage tends to de-
crease pensions, the other changes (the extra half
point in monetary correction and the increase in
the accrual rates) have the opposite effect.
Our results summarize the net effect of these
changes in the CGA. The financing gap decreased
from 73.5 per cent to 66.4 per cent of GDP, while
the long run equilibrium contribution rate de-
creased from 20.8 per cent to 19.6 per cent . Over-
all, the reform reduced the long run imbalance of
Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /June 2002 49
Articles
Chart 10



































AGGREGATE RESULTS BY SCENARIO





Baseline ............. 66.4 19.6
Pessimistic........... 67.6 20.5
Optimistic ........... 64.7 18.7the CGA, but the effects were too small to cause
any major improvement towards sustainability.
6.4. The impact of the 1993 CGA reforms
By comparing what would be our situation to-
day if the 1993 reforms had not occurred with the
pre-2001 situation we can estimate the long run
impact of those reforms. The results are shown in
Table 4: the 1993 reform nearly halved the financ-
ing gap and cut by almost 10 p.p. the long run
equilibrium contribution rate. Although far from
re-establishing the long run sustainability of the
CGA, the 1993 reforms had a major impact reduc-
ing the size of the problem.
6.5. The impact of the “4 for 1" human resources
policy
One of most often mentioned policies meant to
reduce public expenditures and to reduce the
costs to the taxpayer is to downsize the public sec-
tor and to reduce the number of civil servants by a
combination of attrition and sparse hiring. A pro-
posal along these lines has suggested(19) that for a
number of years, the public sector should adopt
the policy that only one new civil servant would
be hired for every four civil servants leaving.
Chart 11 shows the physical results of adopting
such a policy between 2002 and 2006.
The four-for-one policy has a direct impact on
contributors until 2006 as the number of contribu-
tors is expected to decrease almost 60 thousand by
the end of 2006. There are also noticeable reduc-
tions of total and old age and disability pension-
ers. Even though it takes a long time for these re-
ductions to build in, Chart 12 shows that they
eventually reach more than 65 thousand for the
old age and disability pensioners and more than
75 thousand for total pensioners.
Financially, the impact of the 4 for 1 in the CGA
accounts is somewhat smaller because there is
both a reduction in the expenditures and in the
contributions of civil servants. We have concluded
that the long run equilibrium rate is reduced from
19.6 per cent only to 19.4 per cent. However, the fi-
nancing gap decreases by 7.2 percentage points of
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AGGREGATE RESULTS BY SCENARIO






Pr e2001............... 73.5 20.8
Pr e1993............... 141.1 30.7
4f o r1 ................ 59.2 19.4
Reduction after 2035.... 67.0 19.9
Chart 11
CONTRIBUTORS AND PENSIONERS:

























Contributors (4 for 1)
Old age (4 for 1)
Survivors (4 for 1)
Total (4 for 1)
(19)See the report of the Committee on Reforming Public Expendi-
ture, Ecordep, 2001.
Chart 12






















SurvivorsGDP, a direct result of reducing the size of the
civil service. There is also a reduction of the com-
pensation of employees due to the reduction of
the expenditure with wages (see the Table A.9 in
the annex).
6.6. Reducing the size of the civil service after 2035
The long run demographic projections for Por-
tugal imply that the size of the working age popu-
lation will decrease, even when migration flows
are considered. Our GDP scenarios took them into
account but we did not assume any adjustment in
the absolute size of the civil service in order to ac-
commodate that projection. One of the reasons
why, in the earlier simulations, we have found
that the wage bill grows as proportion of GDP is
that the number of civil servants rises as a propor-
tion of working age population.
In this section we report the results of a simula-
tion where the size of the civil service is kept pro-
portional to the labour force from 2035 onwards,
when the decline of this one starts to be notice-
able.
In physical terms, this scenario shows an 8 per
cent reduction in the number of contributors by
2075 along with a 3 per cent reduction in the num-
ber of total pensioners. In financial terms, the dif-
ferences between this scenario and the baseline
are not large. The contributions by subscribers are
smaller by 0.1 per cent of GDP by 2075, total ex-
penditure on pensions is smaller by 0.2 per cent of
GDP but additional general government primary
expenditures with the CGA stay basically the
same. Both the financing gap and the long run
equilibrium contribution rates have minute in-
creases, to 67.0 and 19.9 p.p. respectively. How-
ever, by 2075 we do find a difference in the wage
bill, which goes from 14.4 per cent of GDP in the
baseline to 13.2. This also means that future pen-
sion expenditure reductions do not show up in the
analysis because they will materialize mostly after
2075.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Fiscal discipline is nowadays a pre-condition
for sustainable economic development. In that
framework the European Union member states
committed themselves to keep their public sector
budgets close to balance. The main conclusion
from this study is that maintaining the CGA status
quo will force an increase in public revenues or a
reduction in public expenditures in other public
sector areas so as to compensate for the predict-
able growth in CGA expenditures. The decisions
to increase revenues by using taxation, or to de-
crease other public expenditures, could have ef-
fects as sensitive as or perhaps even more sensi-
tive than reforming the current public sector pen-
sion system.
A second conclusion is that the size of the prob-
lem is not very sensitive to macroeconomic condi-
tions. Faster macroeconomic growth slightly re-
duces the problem, but to an almost negligible ex-
tent.
A third conclusion is that past reforms, in par-
ticular the one implemented in 1993, although in-
sufficient to solve the problem completely, did
have significant positive impacts, demonstrating
that such reforms are clearly worthwhile.
A final conclusion relates to the four-for-one
policy. Despite apparent short and medium run
negative effects on the financial balance of the
CGA, the long run effects are unquestionably pos-
itive. Furthermore, it is a measure that in the ag-
gregate achieves a positive impact on the public fi-
nances even in the short run by decreasing the
general government total compensation of em-
ployees.
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Table A.1
BASELINE – PHYSICAL VARIABLES
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributors (000's) ............................ 6 8 1 7 1 0 7 4 7 7 7 1 7 7 0 7 6 9 7 6 9 7 6 8 7 6 9 7 6 9 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0
Enrolled before 1993......................... 5 1 0 4 9 3 4 7 6 3 9 0 2 9 7 2 0 2 1 1 7 5 4 1 8 3 0 0000
Enrolled after 1993 .......................... 1 7 1 2 1 7 2 7 1 3 8 1 4 7 3 5 6 7 6 5 2 7 1 4 7 5 1 7 6 6 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0
Total Pensioners (000's) ......................... 4 0 7 4 1 8 4 2 8 4 6 8 5 1 8 5 7 7 6 3 2 6 8 2 7 2 5 7 5 3 7 6 7 7 7 1 7 6 1 7 5 7 7 6 4
O l da g e .................................... 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 6 3 9 4 4 5 1 5 0 5 5 5 3 5 9 6 6 2 5 6 4 1 6 4 8 6 4 3 6 4 0 6 4 7
Old age enrolled before 1993 ................. 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 3 3 7 9 4 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 5 3 8 3 3 1 3 2 2 9 1 4 8 3 3 6 6
Old age enrolled after 1993................... 0 0 0 3 1 5 3 7 7 1 1 2 8 2 1 3 3 1 2 4 1 2 5 0 0 6 1 0 6 3 4 6 4 1
Survival .................................... 1 1 3 1 1 6 1 1 9 1 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 6 1 2 7 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 8 1 2 6 1 2 3 1 1 8 1 1 7 1 1 7
Old age dependency ratio ....................... 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84
Total dependency ratio ......................... 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99
Table A.2
4 FOR 1 – PHYSICAL VARIABLES
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributors (000's) ............................ 6 8 1 7 1 0 7 4 7 7 2 3 7 1 0 7 0 9 7 0 9 7 0 9 7 1 0 7 1 0 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1
Enrolled before 1993 ......................... 5 1 0 4 9 3 4 7 6 3 9 0 2 9 7 2 0 2 1 1 7 5 4 1 8 3 0 0000
Enrolled after 1993........................... 1 7 1 2 1 7 2 7 1 3 3 3 4 1 3 5 0 7 5 9 2 6 5 5 6 9 2 7 0 7 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1
Total Pensioners (000's) ......................... 4 0 7 4 1 8 4 2 8 4 6 4 5 1 1 5 6 7 6 2 1 6 6 5 6 9 9 7 1 4 7 1 2 7 0 3 6 8 4 6 8 3 6 9 4
O l da g e .................................... 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 6 3 9 3 4 4 7 4 9 9 5 4 2 5 7 7 5 9 4 5 9 5 5 9 0 5 7 6 5 7 7 5 8 7
Old age enrolled before 1993................. 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 3 3 7 9 4 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 5 3 8 3 3 1 3 2 2 9 1 4 8 3 3 6 6
Old age enrolled after 1993 .................. 0 0 0 3 1 4 3 3 6 5 1 1 7 1 9 4 2 8 1 3 6 6 4 4 2 5 4 3 5 7 1 5 8 1
Survival .................................... 1 1 3 1 1 6 1 1 9 1 1 8 1 1 8 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 7 1 1 3 1 0 8 1 0 6 1 0 7
Old age dependency ratio ....................... 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.83
Total dependency ratio ......................... 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.98ANNEX (Continued)
Table A.3
CIVIL SERVICE REDUCTION AFTER 2035 – PHYSICAL VARIABLES
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributors (000’s)................................ 6 8 1 7 1 0 7 4 7 7 7 1 7 7 0 7 6 9 7 6 9 7 6 8 7 6 9 7 6 9 7 6 1 7 4 6 7 2 6 7 1 9 7 0 7
Enrolled before 1993 ............................. 5 1 0 4 9 3 4 7 6 3 9 0 2 9 7 2 0 2 1 1 7 5 4 1 8300000
Enrolled after 1993............................... 1 7 1 2 1 7 2 7 1 3 8 1 4 7 3 5 6 7 6 5 2 7 1 4 7 5 1 7 6 6 7 6 1 7 4 6 7 2 6 7 1 9 7 0 7
Total Pensioners (000’s) ............................ 4 0 7 4 1 8 4 2 8 4 6 8 5 1 8 5 7 7 6 3 2 6 8 2 7 2 5 7 5 3 7 6 7 7 7 0 7 5 9 7 5 0 7 4 4
O l da g e ....................................... 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 6 3 9 4 4 5 1 5 0 5 5 5 3 5 9 6 6 2 5 6 4 1 6 4 7 6 4 1 6 3 3 6 2 7
Old age enrolled before 1993 .................... 2 9 4 3 0 2 3 0 9 3 4 3 3 7 9 4 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 5 3 8 3 3 1 3 2 2 9 1 4 8 3 3 6 6
Old age enrolled after 1993 ...................... 0003 1 5 3 7 7 1 1 2 8 2 1 3 3 1 2 4 1 2 4 9 9 6 0 8 6 2 7 6 2 1
Survival ....................................... 1 1 3 1 1 6 1 1 9 1 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 6 1 2 7 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 8 1 2 6 1 2 3 1 1 8 1 1 7 1 1 7
Old age dependency ratio .......................... 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89
Total dependency ratio............................. 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.05
Table A.4
BASELINE – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers........................ 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 4
Assumed contribution by General Government ....... 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues.................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Expenditure on pensions ........................... 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 8 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 0 4 . 9 4 . 8 4 . 8 5 . 1 5 . 5
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.8
Civil service wage bill ............................. 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.5 14.0 14.2 14.4
Total compensation of employees.................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.4 15.9 16.3 16.8 16.9 17.2 17.4 17.6 17.8 18.3 18.8 19.4
Implicit debt ......................................120.1 121.8 122.9 127.6 129.8 130.1 128.2 124.6 121.3 118.0 115.5 114.5 118.4 124.4 128.4
On-going equilibrium contribution rate .............. 10.0 13.9 16.9 20.1 22.0 22.6 22.1 21.2 19.7 18.6 18.2 20.8 23.4
On-going equilibrium replacement rate............... 53.8 50.1 45.2 40.3 36.0 33.2 30.6 28.9 27.8 27.2 26.6 26.3 25.6
Debt generated by CGA ............................ 0 . 0 1 . 4 4 . 6 9 . 9 16.9 24.9 33.4 42.2 51.0 60.2 82.3 112.5 153.5
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ...... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 6 2 . 2 2 . 6 3 . 0 3 . 3 3 . 6 4 . 0 5 . 0 6 . 8 9 . 1ANNEX (Continued)
Table A.5
MACRO OPTIMISTIC – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers......................... 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 4
Assumed contribution by General Government........ 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues .................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 2
Expenditure on pensions ............................ 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 4 4 . 7 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 4 . 9 4 . 7 4 . 6 4 . 6 5 . 0 5 . 5
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.8
Civil service wage bill .............................. 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.5 14.0 14.2 14.4
Total compensation of employees .................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.4 15.8 16.2 16.7 16.8 17.1 17.2 17.5 17.6 18.2 18.7 19.4
Implicit debt.......................................121.4 123.2 124.4 129.3 130.9 130.6 128.3 124.3 120.5 116.9 113.9 112.7 117.1 123.7 128.1
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage).... 10.0 13.7 16.4 19.4 21.0 21.4 20.8 19.9 18.3 17.2 17.2 20.2 23.2
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage).... 53.8 50.1 45.2 40.3 36.0 33.2 30.6 28.9 27.8 27.2 26.6 26.3 25.6
Debt generated by CGA............................. 0 . 0 1 . 4 4 . 4 9 . 2 15.5 22.5 29.8 37.3 44.4 51.8 70.2 96.9 134.2
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ....... 0 . 0 0 . 5 0 . 9 1 . 5 2 . 0 2 . 4 2 . 7 3 . 0 3 . 1 3 . 4 4 . 3 6 . 0 8 . 2
Table A.6
MACRO PESSIMISTIC – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers......................... 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 4
Assumed contribution by General Government........ 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues .................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 2
Expenditure on pensions ............................ 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 9 5 . 2 5 . 3 5 . 3 5 . 2 5 . 1 5 . 0 4 . 9 5 . 2 5 . 5
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.9
Civil service wage bill .............................. 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.5 14.0 14.2 14.4
Total compensation of employees .................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.5 15.9 16.4 16.9 17.0 17.4 17.6 17.8 18.0 18.4 18.9 19.4
Implicit debt.......................................118.9 120.5 121.5 126.0 128.8 129.6 128.2 125.1 122.1 119.2 117.1 116.3 119.8 125.0 128.7
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage).... 10.0 14.0 17.3 20.9 23.0 23.7 23.3 22.6 21.2 20.0 19.2 21.3 23.6
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage).... 53.8 50.1 45.3 40.4 36.1 33.3 30.6 28.9 27.8 27.2 26.7 26.4 25.6
Debt generated by CGA............................. 0 . 0 1 . 4 4 . 9 10.7 18.4 27.3 37.0 47.3 58.0 69.2 95.3 129.1 173.8
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ....... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 7 2 . 3 2 . 8 3 . 3 3 . 8 4 . 1 4 . 6 5 . 8 7 . 7 10.1ANNEX (Continued)
Table A.7
PRE 2001 SOCIAL SECURITY REGIME – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers ........................ 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 4
Assumed contribution by General Government........ 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues .................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Expenditure on pensions............................ 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 8 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 1 5 . 4 5 . 7
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.0
Civil service wage bill .............................. 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.5 14.0 14.2 14.4
Total compensation of employees .................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.5 15.9 16.4 16.8 16.9 17.3 17.5 17.8 18.0 18.6 19.1 19.6
Implicit debt.......................................120.4 122.1 123.3 128.3 131.1 132.1 131.0 128.4 126.0 123.7 121.8 121.1 124.3 128.6 131.6
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage).... 10.0 14.0 17.3 20.7 22.6 23.2 22.7 22.1 21.1 20.6 20.9 23.1 24.8
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage).... 53.8 49.9 44.9 40.0 35.7 32.9 30.3 28.7 27.6 27.0 26.5 26.3 25.6
Debt generated by CGA............................. 0 . 0 1 . 4 4 . 8 10.2 17.3 25.4 34.1 43.2 52.7 63.0 88.8 123.9 169.8
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ....... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 6 2 . 2 2 . 7 3 . 1 3 . 5 3 . 8 4 . 3 5 . 6 7 . 6 10.1
Quadro A.8
PRE 1993 CGA REGIME – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers ........................ 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 4
Assumed contribution by General Government........ 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues .................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Expenditure on pensions............................ 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 5 5 . 0 5 . 5 5 . 9 6 . 3 6 . 7 6 . 9 7 . 0 7 . 3 7 . 7 8 . 0
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.4
Civil service wage bill .............................. 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.5 12.5 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.5 14.0 14.1 14.3
Total compensation of employees .................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.6 16.1 16.7 17.4 17.8 18.5 19.0 19.6 20.0 20.8 21.3 21.9
Implicit debt.......................................130.8 133.2 135.5 146.5 155.9 164.1 170.0 173.3 175.1 175.2 174.1 173.8 178.2 183.8 187.6
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage).... 10.0 14.2 17.8 22.0 25.8 29.5 32.7 35.4 36.3 36.5 37.7 40.2 42.3
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage).... 53.6 49.4 44.5 39.7 35.4 32.5 29.7 28.0 27.0 26.6 26.4 26.4 25.8
Debt generated by CGA............................. 0 . 0 1 . 5 5 . 1 11.1 19.8 30.9 44.9 61.8 81.3 103.4 159.2 232.7 326.0
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ....... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 1 1 . 8 2 . 7 3 . 6 4 . 7 5 . 9 7 . 0 8 . 2 11.1 15.0 19.9ANNEX (Continued)
Table A.9
4 FOR 1 – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers .......................... 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3
Assumed contribution by General Government.......... 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues ...................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Expenditure on pensions.............................. 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 4 4 . 8 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 4 . 8 4 . 6 4 . 4 4 . 3 4 . 6 5 . 0
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.4
Civil service wage bill ................................ 11.0 11.5 11.6 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.3 12.6 13.0 13.1 13.3
Total compensation of employees ...................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 14.9 15.1 15.5 15.8 15.8 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.8 17.2 17.8
Implicit debt ........................................119.1 120.6 121.6 125.0 125.9 124.9 121.6 116.6 111.7 107.3 104.0 102.7 106.3 111.5 114.6
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage) ..... 10.0 14.6 18.3 22.0 24.1 24.6 23.5 21.6 18.8 16.8 15.7 18.5 21.1
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage)...... 53.8 49.0 44.1 39.4 35.6 33.1 30.8 29.6 28.9 28.7 28.7 28.4 27.4
Debt generated by CGA .............................. 0 . 0 1 . 5 5 . 1 10.9 18.3 26.6 35.2 43.8 51.8 59.6 77.5 102.4 136.8
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ......... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 1 1 . 7 2 . 3 2 . 7 3 . 1 3 . 3 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 4 5 . 9 7 . 9
Table A.10
CIVIL SERVICE REDUCTION AFTER 2035 – FINANCIAL VARIABLES
As a percentage of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2055 2065 2075
Contributions by subscribers .......................... 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3 1 . 3
Assumed contribution by General Government.......... 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
Other revenues ...................................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Expenditure on pensions.............................. 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 8 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 0 4 . 9 4 . 8 4 . 8 5 . 1 5 . 3
Additional General Government expenditures w/CGA . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.8
Civil service wage bill ................................ 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.3 13.2
Total compensation of employees ...................... 13.9 14.4 14.6 15.4 15.9 16.3 16.8 16.9 17.2 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.6 17.8 18.1
Implicit debt ........................................120.1 121.8 122.9 127.6 129.8 130.1 128.2 124.6 121.3 117.9 115.1 113.7 116.3 120.2 122.4
On-going equilibrium contribution rate (percentage) ..... 10.0 13.9 16.9 20.1 22.0 22.6 22.1 21.2 19.9 19.0 19.0 21.7 24.1
On-going equilibrium replacement rate (percentage)...... 53.8 50.1 45.2 40.3 36.0 33.2 30.6 28.9 27.6 26.8 26.1 26.1 25.7
Debt generated by CGA .............................. 0 . 0 1 . 4 4 . 6 9 . 9 16.9 24.9 33.4 42.2 51.1 60.3 82.9 113.7 154.8
Total General Government expenditure w/CGA ......... 0 . 0 0 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 6 2 . 2 2 . 6 3 . 0 3 . 3 3 . 6 4 . 0 5 . 1 6 . 9 9 . 1